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rew Dalton’s analysis in Longing for the Other does the much needed work of situating 
Levinas alongside other figures in the canon of Western philosophy.1  In so doing, he 
raises the kinds of questions through which we get a clear picture of the uniqueness of 
Levinas’ philosophical position.  By juxtaposing his account of metaphysical desire alongside 
thinkers like Plato, Heidegger and Fichte (to name a few), Dalton establishes the sense in which 
Levinas is both of the tradition and in dialogue with the tradition, but from precisely the 
“outside.” 
 
Given the way Levinas conceptualizes the difference between desire and need, one wonders if 
desire (on Levinas’ terms) can ever be anything other than metaphysical.  Said otherwise, his 
position seems to be that desire categorically stands on (or, at the very least, prepares the way 
for) a radical breaking up of interiority onto that which is beyond.  Dalton illustrates this quite 
successfully in his analysis.  He traces the opposition between desire and what might be more 
accurately described as a relation across need, establishing that the latter presupposes a kind of 
inner life that, though not complete, projects toward a fulfillment of itself, or seeks a larger and 
more enriched version of itself.  There is no object of my desire upon which my identity could 
“feed” in this kind of way.  As he brings Levinas into dialogue with Plato’s account of eros, 
Dalton illustrates the sense in which desire “desires” that which is not only “outside” the 
subject, but more importantly, beyond the subject as well.  
 
This “beyond” takes on an overtly ethical import, but for the moment, the nuance of this 
distinction (between what might be outside without necessarily being beyond) captures what, I 
believe, is particular to the Levinasian framework.  It helps us to understand why, for instance, 
1 Drew M. Dalton, Longing for the Other: Levinas and Metaphysical Desire (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 2009). 
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a Sartrean formulation of consciousness, as an intentional projection of “self,” does not come to 
Levinas as a genuine transcendence, insofar as it does not open up onto the metaphysical.2  The 
Sartrean subject, as a negation of being, is always empty of “self.”  The subject is “for itself,” 
and as such, never coincident with her “self.”  Instead, out of an ontological necessity, 
consciousness moves toward a self that is always on the outside.  If, by transcendence, Sartre 
means a journey toward that which is outside, then the dynamic between consciousness and its 
self would suffice.  But if, along with Levinas, we recognize transcendence as a move toward 
the metaphysical, then my projection toward a self with which I can never coincide would be a 
failed transcendence.  The Sartrean “self” might be on the outside, but it is not, by any means, 
beyond. Dalton’s analysis plays with these levels in order to illustrate Levinas’ unique way of 
accounting for metaphysical desire.  Exteriority, he says, can either be “other and on the same 
level,” or it can be “other and above.”  Metaphysical desire would indicate the kind of 
exteriority, and thus derive its signification from, that which is both outside and above.  Hence, 
in the end, Sartre’s non-coincidence might be read as a “lost immanence,” which Dalton rightly 
aligns with the order of need and not desire.  To be sure, this lost immanence references a sort 
of interruption (at worst, or maybe a minor inconvenience, at best).  But it is not yet what 
Levinas captures in his tropes of metaphysical desire, or what Dalton wants to establish as the 
core of human longing.  
 
In his re-reading of Plato’s eros, Dalton determines that, though the catalyst of the erotic 
movement is regarded as “good,” it is precisely not good for the subject who moves toward the 
object of her love.  Again, we have another distinction, between that which is good (proper) and 
that which might be “good for me,” that highlights the structures that are unique to Levinas’ 
conception of desire, identity, and ultimately, alterity.  In eros, I am transported into a version of 
myself that is truer, and in a sense, more complete.  Nevertheless, Dalton wants to differentiate 
the object of this Platonic love from the destination of a need-inspired journey. He quotes 
another Drew (Hyland), who describes eros “as a movement toward a wholeness which it has 
never before been.”3  So even though love takes me into a “new perfection,” it is very much the 
case that I encounter, in that new perfection, a radical unfamiliarity.  So, in the sense that love 
brings us into relation with something with which we have never been acquainted, there is 
compelling evidence for resonance between Plato’s rendition of eros and a Levinasian account 
of metaphysical desire.  This is insofar as Levinas determines the “metaphysical” in desire to 
rest on a homelessness, and Dalton determines that eros is impossible as a “homecoming.”  “[It] 
would seem that according to Plato no soul can erotically transcend by way of the homely… no 
soul can erotically transcend without becoming alienated from the homely, without diverging 
from the paths familiar to it.”4  Hence, the transport must be toward an “elsewhere,” or toward 
a self that is higher and completely otherwise than we know ourselves to be.  
 
2 For Sartre’s complete analysis on this issue, see Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego: An 
Existentialist Theory of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991).  
3 Dalton, 36 
4 Dalton, 35 
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However, insofar as Levinas reads Plato’s conception of eros as something that “eventually 
ends, like consumption, in the satisfaction of the subject,” he disqualifies love as a movement of 
transascendence.  So it is clear that at least part of what is essential to his account of 
metaphysical desire is that the subject remains dis-satisfied, or un-satiated.  Dalton argues that 
in eros, we actually find that (1) the subject’s desire actually deepens, and doesn’t become 
shallower, the more she pursues the end of eros, and that (2) as a result, the “end” of eros doesn’t 
promise the possibility of satisfaction.  In that regard, the “new perfection” that eros promises, 
or the more complete version of myself that I encounter upon being transported, should not 
reinforce or support my integrity as a subject.  In other words, I should not expect, from love, 
that better, or less-than-finite being against which Levinas warns in his own account of genuine 
transcendence.  Metaphysical desire, in its opposition to need, leaves the subject exposed to that 
which is both outside and beyond. What becomes apparent in Levinas’ collapsing of the 
metaphysical and the ethical is that this exposure is, in every sense, a wounding in the name of 
what is outside and beyond.  So any resonance between eros and metaphysical desire also 
means that wholeness, completion and perfection are never good for me, even if, as Dalton 
points out, it is good.  He reminds us that “[not] everything which is outside the subject carries 
the weight of the metaphysical,” which is to say that not everything “outside” is necessarily 
“beyond.”5  Perhaps we should also note that metaphysical desire indicates a “beyond” that 
must remain “on the outside.”  The end of metaphysical desire is entirely otherwise and 
elsewhere. So when Drew Hyland describes eros as “a movement toward a wholeness which 
[the subject] has never been,” we must bear in mind that this subject never is the wholeness 
which eros promises.  The consequence of this more perfect version of herself is that she is 
entirely otherwise (than being), or denied the kind of integral identity that might reincorporate 
the “beyond” into the inside.  
 
To this end, Levinas identifies the ethical as metaphysical desire’s necessary deflection.  It is the 
social, or an encounter with the Other that secures the necessary break-up of the desiring subject 
of the metaphysical desire.  In other words, though we speak in terms of the object of eros (to 
return to Dalton’s Plato/Levinas analysis), the break-up of the subject, through this (affective) 
transcendence means that metaphysical desire is no longer in terms of an object in the true sense 
of the term.  So in detouring toward the Other as an obsessive responsibility for the Other, 
metaphysical desire operates outside the field of intentionality, where “subject” and “object” 
poles, at least remotely, apply.  As the desiring self is propelled toward the Other, the world no 
longer appears through mechanisms of objectification and thematization.  Instead of there being 
“a manifestation for me,” the Other is “a kind of super bright phenomenon which outshines all 
the intelligible powers of the subject.”6  I find this way of phrasing the Other’s absence to be 
quite informative, since it captures the sense in which the trace of alterity is “felt,” despite its 
never being a manifestation.  To a degree, the Other presents himself as the absence of light for 
me.  But his entrance into my site (or sight) precisely overwhelms the parameters of that site.  In 
other words, even though my eyes are blind to alterity’s mode of signification, I am affected by 
5 Dalton, 20 
6 Dalton, 39 
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that which my eyes are unable to see.  Dalton makes this clear when he explains that “it is 
not…that the Other stands entirely outside of my field.  If he did then the subject could not even 
feel the pull that the Good exercises as the Other.”7 
 
Instead of saying that the Other is an absence of meaning, it is perhaps more accurate to say 
that the Other is the presence of meaninglessness.  She is “the light in which things appear,” if 
by “light” we understand the groundlessness (or “trans-phenomenological,” to borrow from 
Sartre) upon which we engineer our networks of signification.8  This brings to mind a novel by 
José Saramago, which describes a certain “plague” sweeping across an entire community that 
results in a sudden and unexplainable loss of sight.9  But unlike most cases of blindness, in 
which the individual is engulfed in a sea of darkness, this community succumbs to an 
uninterrupted wave of white light when they become blind.  Perhaps we could employ this as 
Levinasians, and read Saramago’s account as a metaphor of the “plague” of ethical obsession.  
To be sure, this sudden and unexplainable blindness results in a kind of debilitation that 
compromises the very possibility of existence, very similar to how Levinas describes the 
subject’s inversion (or impossibility of identity) as she is propelled by the Good, and toward the 
Other, in metaphysical desire.  To a large extent, Saramago’s blindness gives way to a 
restructured “social relation,” insofar as individuals must approach each other, and interact 
with each other, without seeing.  To be sure, apprehending one’s world across intentionality 
does not, in the least, rely on the sense of sight.  But perhaps the narrative in Saramago’s novel 
serves as a metaphor for an intentional projection significantly compromised upon 
encountering the Face.  Caught up in too much light, I am compelled to “see” the Other without 
seeing, or in way that is radically otherwise (than intentionality).  In a similar sense, Dalton’s 
descriptions capture the ethical moment, whereby the subject is overcome by the Other-as-light, 
and has to cope with the Face, who expresses without manifesting.  
 
In that regard, metaphysical desire maintains the Other as he who is made present without 
being given.  So when this movement becomes the lived moment of shame, it is at least partly 
because the Other halts my power to thematize, manifest and make meaningful.  However, we 
must be careful not to read this ethical diversion of metaphysical desire solely in terms of a 
cognitive failure on the part of subjectivity.  Upon encountering the Face, I am called to be for 
the Other (in substitution) in a way that transcends my choices and decisions.  But this election 
is not quite against my will, but rather, prior to the instantiation of my will.  So it is important to 
recognize that Levinas” analysis of shame does not restrict itself to a “transcend or be 
transcended” overture, whereby one subject becomes an object for another subject.  To be sure, 
Dalton captures the significance of shame for Levinas’ analysis of metaphysical desire, when he 
writes, “Indeed, it is this very power of the experience of shame to cast consciousness back 
upon itself as an object for another—this power to objectify the subject—which makes it of such 
7 Dalton, 38 
8 Dalton, 39 
9 José Saramago, Blindness (Harvest Books, 1999). 
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vital importance for [Levinas].”10  But at the same time, Levinas’ claim is not that the anguish of 
shame lies in my imprisonment in an (objectified) “being for the Other” that I can never be “for 
myself.”  Said otherwise, my shame does not result from my inability to apprehend myself the 
way I am apprehended by the Face.  So even though I might describe myself as “objectified” in 
a moment of shame, it is on a uniquely qualified sense of the term.  
 
According to Levinas, I am “cast back upon myself,” in this position of vulnerability, in a way 
that is already beyond “subject and object” dichotomies.  The identity from which I cannot 
escape (the one with which shame acquaints me most intimately) is neither (or no longer) a 
spontaneous subjectivity, nor reified objectivity.  My passivity, Levinas says, is “more passive 
than the passivity of a stone,” and in that regard, I don’t think shame’s sting is quite a 
consequence of the Other’s power to “objectify” me.  Indeed, shame is, upon Levinas” analysis, 
“shame of myself.”  But “[shame’s] whole intensity, everything it contains that stings us, 
consists precisely in our inability not to identify with this being who is already foreign to 
us…”11  It is that nascent reminder that we are strangers to ourselves, in a way that will always 
deny us the kind of autonomy and sovereignty needed for that “subject/object” distinction to 
bear relevance to our human condition.  If it was the case that, in shame, I find myself reduced 
to an object, wouldn’t it also be the case that the Other is the subject for whom I am reduced?  
And if so, wouldn’t this be tantamount to situating my being, and the being of the Other “along 
the same plane,” instead of what Levinas intends, which is that the Other comes to me (or, sure 
enough, “accuses me”) from a Height?  Dalton’s descriptions of shame as “not only a kind of 
passive experience of the subject … [but] also an illumination of the way in which the subject is 
fundamentally passive” seems to clarify this ambiguity.12  In this regard, my being an object for 
the Other indicates an “affectivity of having been open and exposed, [and] reveals the way in 
which the subject is … not hermetically closed in on itself.”13  Hence, the sting of shame does 
not lie in my taking on a reified object-identity.  Rather, shame allows for that most 
unmistakable realization that I am without identity, abandoned to the ontological but already 
opened up onto the metaphysical.  
 
Drew describes this “turn” as one toward a “(truer) freedom,” whereby I choose to be 
responsible for the Other instead of choosing the pleasure of enjoyment and self-preservation.  
This ethical dimension indicates, somewhat retroactively, that my ontological freedom is really 
“a prison.”  This explains why, in shame, I am appalled by the density, or fullness of my being.  
The bond to my being appears in the form of shackles, which hold me back from that “truer 
freedom”—the freedom to visit the possibility of sacrifice.  To be sure, this would save Levinas’ 
conception of shame from being read as an experience of alienation, whereby my being is stolen 
from me by the Other.  If the subject “is invited to choose responsibility for the Other,” then my 
10 Dalton, 119 
11 Levinas, On Escape, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 63. 
12 Dalton, 126-127 
13 Dalton, 127 
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substitution is what I choose, and the subsequent loss of self is not a theft.14  Nevertheless, it 
seems hasty to describe the passivity of being substituted (or the passivity of being called to 
responsibility) in terms of “choice,” and possibility.  Levinas’ own analysis distinguishes 
substitution from a form of alienation or enslavement to the Other, and I read this as the point 
of Dalton’s clarification when he reminds us that “[through] the Other one is freed from the 
demands of need…one is free to devote oneself to the Other.”15  But to describe this in terms of 
an “ethical potentiality” might run the risk of undermining the radical affectivity/passion upon 
which Levinas grounds this drama of substitution.16  In other words, to read, in substitution, the 
end of a movement that “arrives at a higher and entirely novel, but nevertheless more complete, 
expression of [the subject’s] potential” might be to retain what Levinas reads as a Heideggarian 
formulation of death as yet another possibility (of, now, impossibility).17  
 
Hence, the question for us might be, “Can ethical potential be something other than a potential 
that is already mine?”  In the typical sense of “potential,” perhaps not.  But this typical 
understanding is precisely what Levinas attempts to transcend in his formulation of “the 
Infinite within the finite.”  Like the Infinite, (our) ethical potential is something that is “within 
us which could not have been produced by us [and as such, is no longer a modulation of 
spontaneity].”18  In this regard, Dalton pertinently employs a term like ‘possession’, which 
establishes the trace of the Other as something by which we are not “enslaved,” but undeniably 
as something that “slips into us, unbeknownst to us.”  In that regard, we should understand 
ethical potential as a “birth of a new self” that is “never up to me,” but not alienating either. 
Dalton makes this clear in his pronouncement that “[the] accusation of the Other does not 
overpower the ego and wrestle it into submission.”19  Nevertheless, shame makes clear that the 
subject is, in every sense, “traumatized” by the appearance of the Other.  So even though 
responsibility, as Dalton puts it, “frees me from the tyranny of being,”20 it remains important to 
remember that my newfound freedom—to be at the service of the Other—is, indeed, a difficult 
freedom.  It is to be under an obsession, or to undergo a dying without quite being able to die.  
Relative to the “prison of identity,” in which I am enslaved to self-interest, my substitution for 
the Other is not a violating force, and is, to a degree, quite liberating.  But it is still the case that 
shame rests on a “breach” of subjectivity.  This is the breach through which metaphysical desire 
travels, very similar to the way love, on Dalton’s analysis, lays the subject open to that which is 
elsewhere.  Levinas’ account of metaphysical desire very much requires his phenomenology of 
shame, to demonstrate that the subject is already without identity, or broken open by its 
primordial grounding in the “otherwise.”  
 
14 Dalton, 133 
15 Dalton, 41 
16 Dalton, 42 
17 Dalton, 43 
18 Dalton, 45 
19 Dalton, 133 
20 Dalton, 134 
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Hence, in understanding human longing as a travelling toward some final self, through which 
we become “truly human,” it is of imperative importance to retain the severity of this breach in 
subjectivity (a breach that is not, to be sure, a violation).  To be truly human, or to take up my 
obligation to be at the service of the Other, is to let go of a subjectivity to which the categories of 
completion and actuality can never apply.  It is to live my responsibility (for the Other) as an 
incomplete response, or one that is never enough, or one that fails to close in on itself (even in 
some bittersweet guilt for not being able to respond sufficiently to the Other’s demands).  But 
this seems to be the wound upon which Levinas’ radical sense of the metaphysical rests, as well 
as the obsessive content of his account of desire.  In bringing him into conversation with the 
Western canon, Dalton successfully establishes that, though Levinas comes close to others in 
their accounts of longing, it is a closeness that is “in proximity” only. 
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